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COMPELLED UNIONISM IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
AFTER JANUS: WHY UNIONS SHOULD NOT PROFIT
FROM DISSENTING EMPLOYEES
Giovanna Bonafede +

Labor unions in the United States have enjoyed a bright spot in history for
their positive role in the progression of civil rights, workplace safety, gender
equality, and immigrant rights. 1 Unions’ abuse of their power as employees’
sole representative, however, has tarnished this bright spot. As unions grew
from small organizations into multi-level, profit-seeking organizations,
employees who dissented from a union’s agenda began to have their voices
oppressed by the power of compulsory unionism. 2 Compulsory unionism has
forced employees to choose between their political autonomy—choosing
whether to financially support the union or risk discharge from employment—
and a voice and vote in their working conditions. 3
A union’s power in the private workplace derives largely from the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a federal statute aimed at “restoring equality of

Giovanna Bonafede is an alumna of The Catholic University of America Columbus School of
Law, Class of 2021 and an alumna of Villanova University, Class of 2018. For all his guidance
during this process, she thanks Frank D. Garrison, Esq. Frank’s edits, advice, and passion for labor
law were crucial to this Note; no amount of thanks is enough.
1. Our Labor History Timeline, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/about-us/history (last visited
Mar. 5, 2021, 10:30 AM). The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) is a “democratic, voluntary federation of 56 national and international
labor unions that represent[s] 12.5 million working men and women.” About Us, AFL-CIO,
https://aflcio.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). The AFL-CIO uses its financial power,
derived from the union dues of the workers it supports, to advance and influence legislation and
invest in a myriad of industries. Id.
2. Compulsory unionism occurs when “forced dues” clauses are negotiated into employee
contracts. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, https://nilrr.org/compulsoryunionism-education/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). Union officials who demand these forced dues
claim all employees in the bargaining unit get the same benefits “and therefore should pay for the
union’s representation, regardless of whether it is wanted or not.” Id.What are Bargaining Units?,
USAJOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/Help/faq/job-announcement/bargaining-units/ (last visited
Mar. 4, 2021). (“A bargaining unit position is a job that is represented by a labor union. . . . Labor
unions negotiate various conditions of employment . . . , however they [do not] generally negotiate
compensation or other matters that the management team deems to be their sole prerogative. If
your job is in a bargaining unit, you [do not] have to join the union. However, if you want to join
a union, your job must be in a recognized bargaining unit.”) Id.
3. See Ry. Emp.’s Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 236–39 (1956) (discussing a failed
constitutional claim under the Railway Labor Act where challengers argued that money forcibly
obtained to support the union’s political agenda, with which the employees disagreed, violated the
dissenting employees’ constitutional rights); see also Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950) (arguing that unions subject its members to their disciplinary
policies, in turn making them conform to their ideologies).
+
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bargaining power between employers and employees.” 4 The NLRA applies to
most private sector employers and employees, but does not apply to public sector
employers, employers of agricultural workers, or employers of interstate
railroads and airlines. 5
The NLRA gives private sector unions organizational, monetary, and
disciplinary powers to bargain with the employer on behalf of the employees for
employment agreements, known as collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). 6
In exchange for the union’s negotiation on CBAs, which are presumptively
favorable to employee rights, employees who are “consenting” union members
must pay dues to the union. 7 Historically, employees in certain bargaining units
had to pay full union dues—whether they were members of the union or not—
until Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and Communications Workers of
America v. Beck banned the use of compulsory union dues for a union’s political
spending. 8 Because of these opinions, unions in both the public and private
sector could only exact dues for chargeable activities considered “germane” to
collective bargaining activities. 9 For example, chargeable activities include the
“negotiating and administering [of] collective agreements, and the costs of the
4. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). The equality between employers and employees is essential
because
[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
Id.

5. Is my Employer Subject to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)?, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). Public
sector employers are instead restrained by other state and federal statutes that largely mirror the
regulations in the NLRA. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962 71–72 (2004). Similarly, railroad and airline
employers are governed by the Railway Labor Act, a federal statute that has been called the
statutory equivalent to the NLRA. Lehnert v. Ferris Fac. Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 555 (1991).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). CBAs are used to mitigate and eliminate obstructions to the free
flow of commerce by way of negotiating the terms and conditions of the worker’s “employment or
other mutual aid or protection.” Id. § 151.
7. See, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012). “Consenting” union members means employees who
voluntarily elect to become a part of the union. Id.
8. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 517–19, 522 (banning full compulsory union dues in the public
sector); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 752–54 (1988) (banning full
compulsory union dues in the private sector).
9. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519 (defining chargeable activities as those that are “germane to
collective-bargaining activit[ies]; . . . justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor
peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; . . . and [those that do not] significantly add to the burdening of
free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency or union shop.”); Beck, 487 U.S. at 752.
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adjustment and settlement of disputes.” 10 Chargeable activities do not include,
however, using employees’ dues for the union’s political activities. 11 This was
the prevailing rule in the public sector until the recent Supreme Court case, Janus
v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, which
declared all union fees in the public sector unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. 12
Unfortunately, private sector employees are still required to pay union fees
against their will, which may violate their First Amendment freedom of speech
and freedom of association rights. 13 For these constitutional protections to apply
to the private sector and for the holding in Janus to be extended to private sector
unions, there needs to be a showing of state action, and courts have split on this
issue. 14 As defined in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., state action may
exist “in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State.” 15 When the government itself, or a branch of the
government, delegates the authority to exercise a uniquely governmental power
to a private person or entity, then the constitutional protections and limitations
on that power follow.
This Note argues that state action is present under the exclusive representation
scheme in the private workplace based on a theory of state compulsion. State
action exists in private workplaces when labor unions, acting as the exclusive
representative of the employees under the federal authority of the NLRA, deduct
fees from dissenting employees. Private entities, however, do not become state

10. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745–46, 751–52 (explaining Congress’s intent in creating compulsory
unionism as a means of cost sharing between employees for mutually beneficial activities such as
collective bargaining). See Machinits v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
11. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 522; Beck, 487 U.S. at 752 (explaining that expenditures on political
activities do not mutually benefit everyone in the bargaining unit, namely those who oppose the
political causes the union financially supports).
12. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478, 2486 (2018) (holding that Illinois’
agency-fee scheme “violated the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize
private speech on matters of substantial public concern” and that all “public sector agency-shop
arrangements violate the First Amendment”).
13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (explaining that money is often a form of
speech because “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires
the expenditure of money.”).
14. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977) (stating that “the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see Joseph E. Slater, Will Labor Law Prompt
Conservative Justices to Adopt a Radical Theory of State Action?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 62, 69 (2017)
(discussing the implications of a finding of state action in the private sector union context).
15. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (refusing to find state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment when Pennsylvania’s only intervention into the private
company was to approve a termination practice).
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actors merely by extensive regulation; private entities need to assume a
governmental role to fulfill the state action requirement. 16
For nearly fifty years, the Court has consistently held that requiring employees
to pay money to a union raises serious First Amendment concerns. 17 The Court
has held that employees’ constitutional rights—their First Amendment freedom
of speech and associations rights—are violated when this money is used for
political advocacy rather than for activities germane to collective bargaining
duties of the union. 18
In Janus, the Court went one step further by declaring public sector agency
fee requirements categorically unconstitutional under the First Amendment.19
Agency fees—distinct from union dues which union members must pay as a
prerequisite to union membership—are a percentage of union dues which “cover
the basic costs that the union incurs representing” workers who decline to join
their workplace’s union. 20 The Court held that “[n]either an agency fee nor any
other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor
may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee
affirmatively consents to pay.” 21 In Janus, Mark Janus, a state employee whose
unit was represented by a public sector union, refused to join the union because
he opposed both the political and collective bargaining positions in which the
union participated. 22 Mr. Janus challenged the constitutionality of the agency
fees he was forced to pay in order to remain employed, even though he was not
a member of the union. 23
Janus has been highly acclaimed by some, and fervently critiqued by others
in the labor law community. The question the Court should now decide is
16. See id. at 358–59 (holding that state action does not exist because a state agency merely
regulates the action of a private company).
17. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct.
at 2460.
18. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132
HARV. L. REV. 171, 171 (2018) (discussing compelled subsidies from unwilling individuals in the
union and bar membership contexts); see Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36.
19. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
20. Celine McNicholas et al., Janus and Fair Share Fees, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, Feb.
21, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/janus-and-fair-share-fees-the-organizations-financingthe-attack-on-unions-ability-to-represent-workers/. As discussed further in this Note, agency fees
paid by “employees who do not join the union but are part of the bargaining unit . . . cover the
union’s expenses related to collective bargaining and contract administration, but no expenses for
political or ideological advocacy.” Id.
21. Id. at 2486 (holding that employee’s constitutional rights were better protected with a
system requiring affirmative consent to become a union member rather than the opt-out system the
court had previously put into place).
22. Id. at 2461 (stating that Plaintiff, Mark “Janus believes that the Union’s ‘behavior in
bargaining does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his best
interests or the interests of Illinois citizens.’”).
23. Id. at 2462. Although Janus was not forced to be a full, participating member of the union,
he was being forced to financially support the union’s activities. Id. at 2460.
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whether private sector employees should enjoy the same First Amendment
protections in the workplace as their public sector counterparts. Janus was a
huge win for right-to-work groups and public sector employees because it
prohibited public sector unions from forcing nonmembers to pay compulsory
union fees as a term of their employment. Under this holding, objecting
employees have to affirmatively consent to paying union fees rather than having
to opt-out of the wage-deduction system. 24
As noted above, although the Supreme Court decided the question for public
sector unions, the question of the constitutionality of compulsory union fees in
the private sector remains. Public sector cases implicate the First Amendment
because there is clear state action from the government. But it is less clear how
state action is involved in private sector union cases. This Note will explore the
implications of applying the holding in Janus to private sector unions. It will
also argue that state action exists in the private sector unionized workplace based
on theories of exclusive representation, delegation of government authority
through a federal statute, and the extension of Railway Labor Act (RLA)
Supreme Court holdings. This Note will conclude with a discussion of the
potential areas of litigation that might arise in the post-Janus world.
I. PRIOR LAW
A. National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA is a federal statute that outlines the rights and boundaries of
employees, unions, and employers in private sector labor law. Congress enacted
the NLRA to level the playing field between the historically powerful employer
and the employee who generally lacked leverage in determining his or her terms
of employment such as wages and hours. 25 As noted, the Act applies to most
private sector employees (including private universities, retailers, health care
facilities, and manufacturers) but does not apply to federal, state, or local
governments, employers of agricultural workers, or employers subject to the
RLA (including airlines and interstate railroads). 26 The basic policy declared by
the NLRA was to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
24. Id. at 2486.
25. See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, 93D CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (Comm. Print 1974).
The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) is an amendment to the National Labor Relations
Act. Id. at 1.
26. Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://
www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3180 (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
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representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection. 27
The NLRA grants employees the right to “form or join unions; engage in
protected, concerted activities to address or improve working conditions; or
refrain from engaging in these activities.” 28 It is an important facet of the statute
that it gives employees protection for either participating in the union or not
because it means employers or unions may not discriminate against employees
based on their union membership or lack thereof. However, this has not always
been the case. With the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to restrict the activities and power of
labor unions. 29 These amendments outlawed a type of union security agreement,
called the closed shop, “wherein a person is required to be a member of the union
in order to be eligible [for] employment.” 30 These amendments, among other
labor trends in the wake of Congress passing the NLRA, reflected Congress’s
increasing skepticism of the growing power of labor unions, and the recognition
that often employees needed to be protected not only from their employers, but
also from the unions that represented them. 31
B. Railway Labor Act
As Congress enacted the NLRA to protect the private sector labor market,
Congress enacted the RLA to protect the labor markets of interstate railroads
and airlines. 32 Like the NLRA, the RLA was the first federal transportation
statute “guaranteeing the right of workers to organize and join unions and elect
representatives without employer coercion or interference.” 33 Specifically, the
27. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) (holding
that employers cannot be compelled to distribute union literature to its employees at their place of
work—giving employees freedom of choice—unless the union can show that no other reasonable
means of communicating its organizational message exists).
28. Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB, supra note 26.
29. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, 93D CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 409, 545, 734, 1009, 1420
(Comm. Print 1974). The Labor Management Relations Act is another name for the Taft-Hartley
Act.
30. THOMAS R. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS 34 (1978).
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Midwest Transfer Co. of Illinois, 287 F.2d 443 (3d. Cir. 1961) (holding
that an employer and a union cannot agree to make union membership a condition of initially
obtaining a job with the employer).
32. The Railway Labor Act Simplified, PA. FED’N BMWED-IBT, http://www.pennfedbmwe.
org/Docs/reference/RLA_Simplified.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). The Railway Labor Act was
amended to include the airline industries, but only initially covered interstate railroads. Highlights
of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), and the U.S. Department of Transporation’s (“DOT”) Role in
RLA Disputes, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.
gov/files/fra_net/1647/Railway%20Labor%20Act%20Overview.pdf.
33. Id.
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RLA’s purpose was “to avoid work stoppages that threaten to substantially
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the
country essential transportation services.” 34 The RLA tries to encourage
voluntary settlement of disputes over all other options to avoid interruptions in
interstate commerce. 35
The importance of mentioning the RLA in a paper involving an issue governed
by the NLRA is the almost identical nature of the two statutes, as well as the
outcomes courts have reached on issues that parallel both statutes. The
significance of the resemblances between the statutes will be discussed below as
they pertain to Supreme Court decisions. The key difference between the RLA
and the NLRA is that the RLA overrides state right-to-work laws while the
NLRA does not. 36
C. Right-to-Work Laws
During the mid-20th century, Congress proposed changes to the “pro-union”
structure of the NLRA, enacting provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act that only
allows “union shops in the absence of state law to the contrary.” 37 Union shops
are workplaces that do not require union membership as a prerequisite to
obtaining employment but do require that each worker join the union within a
certain period after being hired. 38 The Taft-Hartley Act, later added as section
14(b) to the NLRA, laid “the foundation for right-to-work laws by allowing
states to prohibit union security agreements [and] compulsory union

34. Id. The RLA applies to “freight and commuter railroads, airlines, companies directly or
indirectly controlled by carriers who perform services related to transportation of freight or
passengers and the employees of these railroads, airlines, and companies.” Id.
35. Railway Labor Act, SMART UNION, https://smart-union.org/7113-2/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2020).
36. BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RIGHT TO WORK LAWS:
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 4 (2014).
For example, both a federal appeals court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have
determined that Oklahoma’s prohibition of union security agreements does not extend
to workers covered by the Railway Labor Act. . . . [However,] [s]ince the 104th
Congress, a National Right to Work bill has been introduced in the House during the
first session of each Congress. Similar bills have regularly been introduced in the
Senate during this time. These bills would amend the NLRA by striking the language
that permits union security agreements and would make similar changes to the Railway
Labor Act.
Id. at 5–6.
37. History of Unions and Right-to-Work Laws, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & COMMENTARY (Dec.
17, 2013, 10:36:50 PM), https://www.jurist.org/archives/feature/history-of-unions-and-right-towork-laws/.
38. Union Shop, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/union_
shop (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
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membership” that would weaken the dissenting employee’s voice in a unionized
workplace. 39
Section 14(b) of the NLRA, titled “Agreements requiring union membership
in violation of State law” reads: “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed
as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.” 40
Twenty-eight states and territories currently have state right-to-work laws, while
employees in the remaining states and territories are subject to forced
unionism. 41 The existence of right-to-work states is significant for this Note
because if an employee works in one of these twenty-eight states or territories,
they “not only have the right to refrain from becoming a union member, [they]
cannot be required to pay dues or an agency fee to the union unless [they] choose
to join the union.” 42
D. Supreme Court Cases Before Janus
1. Public Sector Cases
One of the most prolific cases in twentieth century labor law, Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education—which the Supreme Court overturned in Janus—held that
unions cannot use employee dues or fees to finance political activities that the
employee does not personally support. 43 The Court ruled that although it is
constitutionally valid to require public sector employees to pay agency fees to
maintain employment, it is only constitutional “insofar as the service charges are
applied to collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievanceadjustment purposes.” 44 While the Court noted it is not holding that “a union

39. History of Unions and Right-to-Work Laws, supra note 37. Virginia, the first state to
enact a Right to Work Law, contains a provision specifically regarding dues payment: “No
employer shall require any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment,
to pay any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to any labor union or labor organization.” VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-62 (1970).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).
41. Right to Work States, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION,
https://nrtw.org/right-to-work-states (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). The following states and territories
have enacted right to work laws: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
42. Can I Be Required to be a Union Member or Pay Dues to a Union? (Private Sector
Employee), NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK FOUND., https://nrtw.org/required-join-pay-private (last
visited Jan. 12, 2020).
43. See generally Abood, 431 U.S. at 209.
44. Id. at 232; see Hanson, 351 U.S. at 225 (stating that unions may not use objector’s union
funds to “forc[e] ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First . . .
Amendment.”); see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (holding a union
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cannot constitutionally spend [an objector’s] funds for the expression of political
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other
ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining
representative[,]” it does state that the Constitution requires “such expenditures
be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against
their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.” 45
The Court later decided Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, a
forced fees case based on constitutional principles. The Court held that First
Amendment due process requires unions to provide certain safeguards before
they can collect forced union fees from public employees. 46 The majority
explained that nonmembers have a constitutional right to prevent the union from
spending their required fees on political causes, stating that
[t]he fact that the [nonmembers] are compelled to make, rather than
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no
less an infringement of their constitutional rights. For at the heart of
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to
believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State. 47
The Court’s recognition of a First Amendment constitutional right to not have
nonmember’s fees used for political purposes suggested the Court believed that
paying is speaking.
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court decided Davenport v. Washington
Education Association, affirming the constitutionality of right-to-work laws and
holding that because unions do not have a constitutional right to collect dues
from nonmembers, a state may require unions to get affirmative consent from a
public employee before spending their dues on political activities. 48 This
affirmative consent option conflicted with the default opt-out system most
unions had in place where, for an objector to ensure that his forced union dues
does not have the power to use a dissenter’s exacted union funds to support political causes which
he or she opposes).
45. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. It is important to note that this case does not stand for the
proposition that no union dues can be used towards the advancement of the union’s ideological
causes; rather, only such expenditures can be financed from dues “paid by employees who do not
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the
threat of loss of governmental employment.” Id. at 236.
46. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986). The Court
specified that the procedural safeguards necessary to protect dissenting nonmembers from forced
fees were as follows: adequate notice of the fee’s basis along with an independent audit, prompt
neutral review of nonmember’s challenges, and “an escrow for amounts reasonably in dispute.” Id.
at 310.
47. Id. at 301 n.9; see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1976) (discussing the
implications of the First Amendment freedoms of belief and of association).
48. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191 (2007).
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were not being used to finance a political campaign, they would have go through
a tedious process of opting out of political expenditures. 49 If an objector did not
opt-out during the specified period to do so, their dues or fees would
automatically be used by the union until the next opt-out period. 50
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, establishing
that “when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase,
the union must provide [a notice of the purpose of the assessment or increase]
and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative
consent.” 51 The Court noted that “‘First Amendment values [would be] at
serious risk if the government [could] compel a particular citizen, or a discrete
group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that [the
government] favors.’” 52 This opinion went further than Davenport by requiring
affirmative consent for dues increases or special expenditures, whatever these
expenditures were on, rather than simply authorizing the state to implement an
affirmative consent system.
The last major public sector union case that set the stage for the decision in
Janus was the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Quinn. The Court held an
Illinois requirement that nonunion Medicaid-funded home-care personal
assistants pay union fees unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 53 In
Harris, the Court refused to extend the decision in Abood, which upheld forced
fees on public employees for collective bargaining purposes, to this situation
“[b]ecause of Abood’s questionable foundations, and because the personal
assistants are quite different from full-fledge public employees.” 54 The Court
recognized that the central issues in public sector collective bargaining, “such as
wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues.” 55 This holding
foreshadowed what the Court later decided in Janus: if a case involving
employees more like a typical public employee were to come before the Court,
a majority may overrule Abood and hold that public sector forced fee
requirements are unconstitutional.
Then came the twenty-first century’s landmark case—Janus. As noted, this
case overruled Abood and held that public sector agency fee requirements were
49. Id. at 182. The union objector used a provision of the Fair Campaign Practices Act in his
argument: “A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a
member of the organization to make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to
operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.” Id.
50. See generally id. at 183 (describing the process of the “Hudson packet” opt-out
procedure).
51. Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 322 (2012). The Court also held that unions
cannot constitutionally charge nonmembers for its expenditures opposing ballot questions even if
they “may be said to have an effect on present and future contracts between public-sector workers
and their employers.” Id. at 320–21.
52. Id. at 322 (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001)).
53. Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 620 (2014).
54. Id. at 645–46.
55. Id. at 636.
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unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 56 The Court declared that
“[n]either an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted
from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such
a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.” 57
2. Private Sector Cases
Private sector cases, like Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, have been
decided differently and with greater deference to unions than their public sector
counterparts. Nevertheless, in Ellis, the Court held that under the RLA, coerced
financial support of a union’s ideological or political causes, and other union
activities not concerning the dissenting employee’s particular bargaining unit, is
prohibited. 58 The Court reasoned:
[B]y allowing the union at all, we have already countenanced a
significant impingement on First Amendment rights. The dissenting
employee is forced to support financially an organization with whose
principles and demands he may disagree. ‘To be required to help
finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be
thought…to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom to
associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as
he sees fit.’ 59
The majority went even further by prohibiting the union’s improper use of
dissenter’s funds even for temporary use, thus prohibiting “rebate” schemes
where unions could use dues or fees for improper uses and only later refund the
amount exacted to dissenting employees. 60
Later the Court declared in Communications Workers v. Beck that the NLRA
and RLA’s provisions authorizing compulsory unionism arrangements are
substantially “identical” and that Congress intended for them “to have the same
meaning.” 61 The Court thus held that like the RLA in Hudson, the NLRA
“authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘performing
the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
employer on labor-management issues.’” 62 Private sector employees thus were
granted the same rights as airline, railway, and public employees to not subsidize
a union’s non-bargaining activities.
56. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
57. Id. at 2486. The Court explained that “[b]y agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving
their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed.” Id.
58. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 466 U.S. 435, 455–56 (1984).
59. Id. at 455. The Court notes that although the dissenting employee’s First Amendment
rights have been infringed upon in this case, “[i]t has long been settled that such interference with
First Amendment rights is justified by the governmental interest in industrial peace.” Id. at 455–
56.
60. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 457.
61. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 746–47 (1988).
62. Id. at 762–63 (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448).
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II. JANUS’ IMPACT
Before Janus, hundreds of thousands of employees had large portions of their
money unfairly exacted from them without their consent. After four decades of
old precedent created by Abood, public employers and labor unions can no
longer require employees to pay for the unions’ costs of negotiating and
enforcing labor contracts on employees’ behalf. 63 This decision gave protected
employees First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of association
rights once and for all. It allowed those dissenters to be free from any financial
coercion, not only for the union’s political causes, but also for contract
negotiations and administration. Because of Janus, thousands of public sector
labor-management contracts affecting millions of government employees were
partially invalidated. 64 This decision will more than likely have a considerable
adverse effect on union revenues and union membership in the “twenty-two
states [plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia] that allowed government
employers to collect fair-share fees from union-represented employees who
chose not to join the union.” 65
Critics of the decision consider Janus to be “a huge blow to public-sector
unions and the labor movement,” and view the decision a win for so-called
connivingly opportunistic “free-riders.” 66 Those who oppose the holding in
Janus argue that now, “union members have an incentive to become ‘freeriders,’ benefiting from collective bargaining but not paying for it.” 67 The
critiquing argument sides with Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting opinion which
scrutinized the majority’s cold shoulder to the stare decisis doctrine, arguing that
the majority “overturned a previous decision, deeply entrenched in the real
world, with little justification.” 68 It does so, Kagan wrote, “by weaponizing the
First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to
intervene in economic and regulatory policy.” 69 This argument, however, is
63. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A Reply to
Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 42 (2018).
64. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487–88 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“More than 20 States have statutory schemes built on the decision. Those laws underpin thousands
of ongoing contracts involving millions of employees. Reliance interests do not come any stronger
than those surrounding Abood. And likewise, judicial disruption does not get any greater than what
the Court does today.”); Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 63, at 42–43. Janus only invalidated the
“agency fee” portions of collective bargaining agreements. Id.
65. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 63, at 42.
66. Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public-Sector Unions in America?, THE ATLANTIC
(June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-afscme-publicsector-unions/563879/.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. A study by Frank Manzo and Robert Bruno, skeptics of Janus, suggest “[t]he decision
could also mean that unions will have less political impact than they once did. The decline of
unions has already had implications for national politics: Some analyses argue that Hillary Clinton
would have been elected president had union membership been higher.” Id.
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incorrect, superficial, and charged with political bias, without regard for the
Constitution and the minority views of employees.
A. Post-Janus Litigation
In the wake of Janus, there has been a rise in labor litigation on multiple
fronts. First, there have been dozens of suits filed “seeking repayment of fees
paid going back for as many years as the statute of limitations will allow.” 70 If
courts conclude that Janus applies retroactively, the potential liabilities are
staggering because the unions will be forced to refund or pay damages for all the
fees paid by dissenting employees within applicable statute of limitations. 71 For
example, in Oliver v. Service Employees International Union Local 668, a
former union member brought suit seeking monetary damages against her
former union for “membership dues paid to the Union from the beginning of her
employment in December 2014 through the date of her resignation in August
2018.” 72 The plaintiff argued that she could not have “given her ‘affirmative
consent’ in her choice to become a member and is now entitled to a full refund
on her membership dues.” 73 The court, however, disagreed and held that she
cannot recover damages because she was not compelled to join the union in the
first place. 74 This court also discussed issues concerning both standing and
mootness because the plaintiff was no longer a union member. 75 Similarly, in
Hendrickson v. AFSCME, Council 18, a former union member and state
employee brought action against the union alleging violation of his First
Amendment rights to free speech and free association, and seeking monetary
damages for past union dues. 76 Like in Oliver, the court held that the employee’s
claim for relief requesting past union dues was moot because the employee
voluntarily chose to contract with the union, therefore negating any First
Amendment claim. 77
70. Catherine L. Fisk, Janus and the Future of Unions, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY,
https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/janus-and-the-future-of-unions/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2021). Fisk also highlights another issue Janus poses: whether the decision will
lead to a dramatic drop in union membership. Id. She suggests that anti-union groups are going
head to head with unions in encouraging employees to “quit their union and quit paying dues by
convincing them that they can get the benefits of the union contract without paying for it,” while
unions are “vigorously signing up fee-payers as full members.” Id.
71. Id.
72. Oliver v. SEIU, Local 668, 415 F. Supp. 3d 602, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 613. The court noted that “[a]gency fees are not at issue in this case, because they
would be subsumed by the union dues that Plaintiff voluntarily paid. Even if they were, no federal
court has interpreted Janus as entitling non-members to a refund of agency fees.” Id. at 608 n.7;
see Cook v. Brown, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1193 (D. Or. 2019) (noting that “there is no indication
that Janus intended to open the floodgates to retroactive monetary relief.”).
75. Oliver, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
76. Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18, 434 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1018 (D.N.M. 2020), aff’d,
No. 20-2018, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 8878 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 2021).
77. Id. at 1022.
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Second, many suits have been filed seeking to expand the prohibition on union
dues to a full prohibition on union exclusive representation based on a majority
rule. 78 The plaintiff’s argument is that:
[I]f paying fees to support bargaining is unconstitutional, it should be
unconstitutional for a union to negotiate a contract on behalf of those
who do not want union representation at all. Anti-union advocates
have lost those cases before. The majority stated that it was not calling
majority-rule representation into doubt. 79
Cases like Bierman v. Dayton, highlight the opposing view rejecting
challenges to exclusive representation. 80 Here, the plaintiffs claimed the
Minnesota law, which permitted union representation, violated their First
Amendment right to freedom of association. 81 The court was not convinced,
finding that “the employees had not shown that the state’s recognition of the
union infringed on the First Amendment rights of non-members to freedom of
association in the form of a mandatory agency relationship, as they were not
required to pay dues or union fees.” 82
The theories behind these two types of prospective litigation support this
Note’s greater argument that Janus should be extended to the private sector
because public sector employees should not be afforded greater constitutional
protections just because they work for the government.
Currently, private sector employees in unionized workplaces have an option
that could partially satisfy their disdain for financing a cause they do not support,
at least for the short term. These employees who do not wish to be union
members can file paperwork as a Beck objector, “which means they pay lower
fees that go only to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance
adjustment.” 83 Yet, the fee reduction for the Beck objector is usually only about
fifteen percent less than normal full union dues, and for many busy employees,

78. See Fisk, supra note 70.
79. Id.
80. Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043
(2019).
81. Id.; see also Mentele v. Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 791 (9th Cir. 2019) (designation of SEIU as
the exclusive bargaining representative did not violate worker’s First Amendment rights); Branch
v. Commonwealth Emp. Relations Bd., 481 Mass. 810, 828–29 (2019) (finding exclusive
representation coupled with the duty of fair representation not to be violative of the Constitution);
Uradnik v. Inter Fac. Org., No. 18-1895, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165951 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018)
(denying a motion for a preliminary injunction in case challenging constitutionality of forced
representation by a union).
82. Ronald J. Kramer, Janus One Year Later: Litigation Has Come, AM. BAR ASS’N, (July
23, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/state_local_government/publications/state_local_
law_news/2018-19/summer/janus-one-year-later-litigation-has-come/.
83. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Supreme Court’s Janus Ruling Could Undercut Private Sector
Unions Too, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 11, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-bizjanus-private-sector-ramifications-20180709-story.html.
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this unfortunately is not worth the hassle. More enticing would be the option to
opt out entirely.
This Note argues that the one obstacle that courts have found when debating
whether the decision in Janus can be extended to the private sector—state
action—is a non-issue because of the clear federal authorization of union action
through the NLRA and the RLA. 84 This Note will argue that the exclusive
representation scheme set up by the federal government is also evidence of state
action because of the government-like coercive monopoly power unions are
granted because of these federal statutes. 85 Further, the collective bargaining
agreement is nothing like a sample contract between two private entities, rather
it is like a contract between a private actor and a government actor. A finding
of state action in the private sector union context would extend the holding in
Janus to the private sector, thus protecting private sector employees from being
forced to pay fees to unions which they do not support.
III. ANALYSIS
A. State Action Exists in the Private Sector: Private Employees Should be
Afforded the Same Protections as Public Employees
1. State Action Doctrine
There are three main judicially created theories of state action: nexus,
conspiracy, and the Edmonson test. The nexus theory of state action applies
when government regulations underlie the claim of state action. 86 This theory
focuses on the link between the government regulation and the alleged
constitutional violation: “[t]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently
close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity
so the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 87 The
conspiracy or joint action theory of state action involves a court’s examination
of “whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting
a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” 88 The plaintiff may prove joint
action by showing that there was “a conspiracy or by showing [a] private party
was ‘a willful participant in the joint action.’” 89 The Edmonson state action test
involves a two-part inquiry: (1) the deprivation must be caused by exercising
some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible; and (2) the party
84. See, infra 24−26.
85. See, infra 26−27.
86. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
87. Id.; see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1002–05 (1982).
88. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gallagher v. Neil Young
Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995)).
89. See id.
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charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor. 90
State action is affirmatively present under the exclusive representation scheme
in the private workplace based on a theory of state compulsion. This is because,
“[t]he state action doctrine allows a court to find that private actions constitute
government activity if there is significant involvement by the government.” 91
To illustrate, in Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., the Supreme Court
held that even though Amtrak was a nominally private corporation, it “could be
sued as a government actor under the First Amendment because of the extensive
role the federal government played in Amtrak’s activities.” 92 Although there are
several variations of the state action doctrine, courts emphasize the nature and
scope of the government involvement. 93 Private sector unions collecting agency
fees could be treated as government actors in ways consistent with the state
action doctrine for two main reasons. 94 First, the state action doctrine is factintensive, applied flexibly, and lacks hard rules in its application. 95 The second
reason is that “private sector unions’ use of agency shop agreements could be
construed as nominally private decisions that have been encouraged by the
government to the extent that they constitute state action.” 96 The state action
doctrine does not concretely answer whether Janus—striking down public sector
agency fees—applies to the private sector. 97 Due to this uncertainty, “the
Supreme Court could hold that the NLRA’s structure has given such a powerful
incentive for unions to pursue agency fee arrangements, that unions doing so are
effectively engaging in state action.” 98
2. State Action Under the NLRA & RLA
The Supreme Court outlined in Communications Workers of America v. Beck
that any action taken under the RLA—a federal statute equivalent to the
NLRA—constitutes state action. 99 This supports the overall argument that
unions, when acting under federal statutes, are state actors because they act

90. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
91. Boyd Garriott, How Janus Could Spill into the Private Sector Without Radically
Redefining the State Action Doctrine, ONLABOR (Apr. 19, 2018), https://onlabor.org/how-januscould-spill-into-the-private-sector-without-radically-redefining-the-state-action-doctrine/.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250–251 (1963) (holding that a
private restaurant’s discriminatory behavior was state action because a local ordinance required the
restaurant to discriminate).
97. Garriott, supra note 91.
98. See Garriott, supra note 91.
99. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761–63 (1988); see Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 695–96 (1963).
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under color of federal law. 100 That unions operate, in part, to aid in the peaceful
and reliable settlement of employee grievances, and are aided in that exercise by
the federal force given to collective bargaining agreements paid under federal
law, is precisely the nexus between government and private actors that the First
Circuit found sufficient to constitute state action in Linscott v. Miller Falls Co.101
It is like the circumstances where parties subject to the NLRA are forced to act
or refrain from acting by the mandates of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), which the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have all held to constitute
state action. 102
In three paramount cases, the Supreme Court found state action under the
RLA: Hanson, Street, and Ellis. In Hanson, the Court held that state action was
present because “the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by
which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.” 103 In Street, the Court reaffirmed
its conclusion in Hanson that using dissenting members’ dues, which were
compelled by a union security agreement negotiated under the RLA, involved
state action. 104 That said, the Court in Hanson held that because the statute itself
prohibited the use of dissenting members’ dues for political purposes, the case
could be decided without reaching the constitutional issue. 105 Last, in Ellis, the

100. Metaphors, like the phrase “act under color of law,” refer to a concept “in which a target
domain is understood in terms of a source domain of more readily comprehended, embodied
experience.” Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323,
390 (1992).
101. Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding state action under the
LMRA, comparing the LMRA to the RLA).
102. See Beck v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1207–09 (4th Cir. 1985);
Linscott, 440 F.2d at 16–17; Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1970).
103. Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1956). The Court described the
wide-ranged issues that are tendered under the First Amendment:
It is argued that the union shop agreement forces men into ideological and political
associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association,
and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights. It is said that once a man
becomes a member of these unions he is subject to vast disciplinary control and that
by force of the federal Act unions now can make him conform to their ideology. On
the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment
rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a
member of an integrated bar.
Id. at 236–38.
104. Street, 367 U.S. at 746–50. The Court again evaded answering the constitutional
questions, ruling that the RLA “prohibits unions from using objecting nonmembers’ compulsory
dues for political purposes. The Court did not clearly define political purposes, nor did it address
whether unions could lawfully use objectors’ monies for nonpolitical activities unrelated to
collective bargaining.” Foundation Supreme Court Cases, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND, https://www.nrtw.org/foundation-supreme-court-cases/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2021).
105. Street, 367 U.S. at 748–49.
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Court revealed again its conclusion that state action exists when parties subject
to the RLA negotiate union security agreements. 106
3. Exclusive Representation
State action is present in a private unionized environment under the exclusive
representation relationship between unions and employees. This relationship is
authorized by the NLRA, a federal labor statute. 107 The NLRA provides unions
with organizational, disciplinary, and monetary power that is the functional
equivalent of “granting governmental coercive power to unions.” 108 Exclusive
representation can become coercive because once a union representative has
been certified, they are the sole way employees may communicate with their
employer concerning terms of employment. 109 And based on the collective
bargaining agreement negotiated by the union and the employer, the union
representative has the power to execute and administer the rules of the CBA. 110
State action thus exists through the government delegation of union power over
private employers and employees through the NLRA. But for the federal
government’s authorization of union imposition into the private workplace
through the NLRA, unions would not have the power to collect money,
discipline employees, and enforce CBAs. In this way, unions serve as actors on
behalf of the federal government.
4. Close Government Regulation
A union’s exclusive representation relationship imposes state action into a
private workplace because of the close government regulation of all aspects of
the collective bargaining process . CBAs are unlike any other contract between
private parties, and instead resemble government contracts. Mainly, CBAs are
created through a government-controlled process, a process in which First
Amendment speech rights are suspended because of the union’s status as the
employees’ exclusive representative. 111 Moreover under the NLRA, union
representatives are selected through an election process executed by the NLRB,
an independent government agency charged with enforcing the NLRA. 112
Further, the government controls the contract discussions and negotiations,
106. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 466 U.S. 435, 455–56 (1984).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). Exclusive representation is not required unless employees
vote for the union as their exclusive representative. Robert P. Hunter, Exclusive Representation,
MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y (May 1, 1997), https://www.mackinac.org/1007.
108. See Hunter, supra note 107.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); see J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337–38 (1994) (interpreting
the NLRA and RLA as prohibiting employees from individually negotiating their terms and
conditions of employment where an exclusive bargaining representative has been recognized).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944)
(holding that exclusive representatives have the duty to represent non-members “fairly”).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
112. Id. § 153(a)–(b).
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which imposes a duty to bargain in good faith upon the union and the employer
over the employees’ terms of employment. 113
CBAs differ from other contracts between private parties in that the
government regulates who can be fired and when, imposes special procedures to
enforce the CBA, and imposes agent-principal rules on the parties. 114 For
example, the NLRA prohibits an employee from being fired based on their union
membership status. 115 That the government regulates the conduct of all parties
to the contract is unlike other contracts between private parties where the parties
themselves govern their conduct. This indicates that unions are more
comparable to government actors than to private parties, based on unions’ power
over the structure and execution of the workplace they represent.
Extensive regulation does not, however, transform private entities into
government entities. 116 Rather, it is when an entity performs those functions that
have been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the federal government that
it is considered a government agency. 117
5. Governmental Pressure to Include Union Security Clauses
Union security clauses are commonplace in CBAs because of governmental
pressure to include them. Although the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed closed shop
agreements—agreements requiring persons to be members of the union to be
eligible for employment—agency fee agreements are still permitted in the
private sector. 118 These agreements require employees in the bargaining unit to
join the union, if only in the financial sense of paying core dues to the union, to
maintain employment with the employer. 119 Although employers and unions do
not have to agree to a union security clause, the government, through the NLRA,
places substantial pressure on the parties to do so as these clauses are mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 120 Because the NLRB administers union security

113. Id. § 158(d).
114. Id. at §§ 158(a)(3), 158(e); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (establishing that, “as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in [the] bargaining unit, the Union ha[s]
a statutory duty fairly to represent all of those employees, both in its collective bargaining[], and in
its enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement”) (citations omitted); Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (holding for the first time that a union’s breach of its statutory
duty of fair representation is a union unfair labor practice).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
116. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
117. Id. at 351; see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
118. Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 111 (1985).
119. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1963).
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d), 159(a); see Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 737–38, 740
(showing that governmental pressure to agree to some form of union security clause is applied by
the NLRB and the federal courts); see also Queen Mary Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 409
(9th Cir. 1977); see also NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130, 133 (9th Cir. 1949).
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clauses, this direct governmental involvement supports a finding of state
action. 121
6. Payment of Dues by Nonmembers
More evidence of state action in the private workplace branches off from
nonunion members inescapably subject to union security clauses. Because
union security clauses apply to all private employees in the bargaining unit,
individuals are compelled to become financial members of the union even if they
are not compelled to participate in union activities. 122 This means that
nonmembers are being compelled by the NLRB to support an entity they dislike,
or be fired. This “pay-or-leave” requirement imposed by the NLRB cannot be
said to be private conduct. It is the federal agency, not the union itself, that will
uphold and require firing of a nonmember who refuses to pay dues.
IV. CONCLUSION
State action is affirmatively present under the exclusive representation scheme
in the private workplace based on a theory of state compulsion. In the union
context, private actors (the unions) are directly authorized by the legislature
(through the NLRA) to wield the specific power used to infringe dissenting
employees’ First Amendment rights. Thus, the constitutional protections of the
First Amendment apply when recalcitrant nonunion members are being subject
to compulsory unionism.
It is unjust and unconstitutional to allow the views of minority workers to be
suppressed by the impending and coercive power of American labor unions.
Unions have grown far too political and have lost sight of the very reason they
were created: to ensure that the individual voices of workers in the workplace
were not overpowered by their employers or by superiors. Unfortunately, unions
have created an environment they had at first wanted to mend. The dissenter
should maintain just as much power and constitutional rights in the private sector
as in the public sector.

121. See Havas v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 509 F. Supp. 144, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(finding state action under the NLRA based on the federal government’s “omnipresent weight and
power in this case behind the agency shop clause contained in the collective bargaining
agreement.”).
122. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761–63 (1988) (holding that
nonunion private sector employees must pay union dues covering collective bargaining activities).

